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I. INTRODUCTION
How should judges interpret statutes? For some scholars and judges,
interpreting statutes requires little more than a close examination of
statutory language, with perhaps a dictionary and a few interpretive
canons nearby.' For others, statutory interpretation must be based upon
an assessment of a statute's underlying purpose, an evaluation of society's
current norms and values, 3 or a normative objective, such as the "law's
integrity. ' 4 With such differences squarely framed in the literature, it is
reasonable to ask whether anything of value can be added. We contend
that there is.
Like many others, we begin with the premise that statutory interpretation
is a quest by judges to use the best available theory and information to
determine "what statutes mean." When seen in this light, two attributes
of statutes merit attention:
(1) Statutes are a form of communication;
(2) Statutes contain a constitutionally privileged command of
the form, "If you are in situation X, then you must do Y."
In other words, statutes are manufactured by a constitutionally authorized
legislative body, and are directed towards those who are constitutionally
1. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1119 (1998); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 14-37 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).
2. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (1994).
3. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1990); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,
87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988).
4. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 164-67 (1986).
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obligated to implement, enforce, or follow the law. We contend that the
purpose of statutory interpretation is to produce a constitutionally
legitimate decoding of statutory commands in cases where the meaning
of X, Y, or both is contested. This perspective leads us to a unique
conclusion about the conditions under which judges can use legislative
records to more accurately decode a statute's Xs and Ys.
Our attention to communication leads to these conditions because it
clarifies how legislators compress ideas and collective understandings
into the descriptions of various institutions and prescriptions that appear
on statutory parchment. Many prominent claims about statutory
interpretation are based on unrealistic or unrecognizable theories of
how people decide which words to use when attempting to convey ideas
to others. The consequences of proceeding in such a manner include
opaque interpretative guidelines that are difficult to apply uniformly or
to reconcile with constitutional imperatives.
We argue that a few scientific propositions about human communication
can aid in determining what a statute's authors meant when they chose to
include, or not to include, particular words in a piece of legislation. To this
end, Part II builds from well-known communication theories. The key
insight of such theories is that successful inference about meaning
requires that the manner in which a communication is decoded, or
the expansion of the signal into information, relate to aspects of its
manufacture-the compression of information into a signal-in particular
ways. This insight suggests that discerning the meaning of any piece of
legislation requires an understanding of the ways that such legislation
was manufactured throughout the legislative process. This insight also
provides important clues about the kinds of informational sources that
can be useful to those who want to clarify a statute's meaning.
Turning our attention to command yields refined interpretive guidelines.
It does so by leading us to examine how constitutional authority affects
the credibility of potential sources of information about a statute's
meaning. To see how, note that the Constitution empowers Congress to
issue statutory commands. However, much of the process by which
Congress manufactures its commands is left to its discretion. 5 Both
houses, in turn, have chosen rules that confer important benefits to the
majority party (particularly since the late nineteenth century) and that
reward and punish selected activities. These rules are relevant to questions
5. U.S. CONST. art I, § 5.
of statutory interpretation because they affect the communicative
incentives of those who participate in the lawmaking process.6 These
rules provide some actors-particularly members of the minority party,
who are often shut out of the legislative process-with incentives to
grandstand or dissemble in their descriptions of particular statutes. They
provide others with strong incentives to communicate exactly what they
are thinking, or exactly what a group of legislators are agreeing to, at
important moments in a statute's development. Indeed, as we later suggest,
this implies that communications among members of the majority party
are particularly useful for discerning the meaning of statutes.
Understanding the relationship between legislative rules and
communicative incentives provides an improved framework for sorting
credible sources of information about a statute's meaning from sources
that should be ignored. To this end, Part III combines a theory of
communication with the positive political theory of legislation to help
jurists differentiate conditions for communicative sincerity from conditions
for grandstanding and dissembling.7 This new theory clarifies the conditions
under which particular kinds of legislative records can be useful in
decoding statutory prescriptions. For example, legislative records may
help jurists to discern the meaning of statutes when they include detailed
testimony from constitutionally empowered actors (or from actors to
whom constitutional authority was rightly delegated) about the meaning
of a statutory prescription. These conditions provide a template for
understanding when judges should ignore claims about a statute's
meaning and when legislative records can aid their search for meaning.
Part IV compares the interpretative guidelines that follow from our
emphasis on communication and command with those offered by textualism,
purposivism, and other legally or politically valued approaches. We find
each of these approaches difficult to reconcile with even very basic
insights from the communication and legislative decision-making theories
that we introduce. Such inconsistencies suggest that widely held
interpretive edicts are very different from the guidelines that the best
available theory and information about the communicative properties of
6. McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The
Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003) [hereinafter Rodriguez
& Weingast, Positive Political Theory]; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The
Paradox of Expansionist Statutory Interpretations, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207 (2007)
[hereinafter Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox]; Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew D. McCubbins
& Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Interpretation and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 2131 (2005).
7. Ronald Dworkin also recognizes the importance of linking together normative
and positive theories. RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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statutes would suggest. This conclusion undermines the normative aims
of some approaches and raises deep questions about the uniform
applicability of others. In sum, we claim that treating statutes as
communications from constitutionally privileged actors can yield more
effective advice about the conditions under which judges can use select
pieces of the legislative record to decode statutory meaning more
accurately.
II. STATUTES AS COMMUNICATIONS
This section begins by offering three foundational assumptions and by
saying a bit about the challenge they pose to questions about a statute's
meaning. We then relate basic insights from a seminal communication
theory to fundamental questions of statutory interpretation.
A. Three Core Assumptions and Their Implications
First and foremost, we assume that statutory interpretation reflects a
fidelity to legislative supremacy and the constitutional structure of
legislative and judicial power. Interpreting the meaning of statutes is a
project defined by Article 1, Section 7 of the United States Constitution.
We regard the legislature's communications as supreme precisely
because the Constitution so says.
Second, since Article I grants to the legislative branch sole authority
to create statutes, we assume that interpreters should restrict themselves
to discerning the legislature's intended meaning. Though the text of the
Constitution does not say so explicitly, its architecture and history are
best understood as prohibiting interpreters from substituting their own
meaning for that of the legislature. Indeed, as Hamilton noted in Federalist
No. 78:
It can be of no weight to say, that the courts on the pretense of a repugnancy,
may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of the
legislature.... The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would equally
be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The
observation, if it proved any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges
distinct from that body.
8
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 380-81 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed.,
2003).
In this regard, we follow many influential scholars who believe in this
view of judicial discretion and the proper objective of statutory
interpretation. As a leading textualist scholar, John Manning, notes: "[I]f
Congress legislates within constitutional boundaries, the federal judge's
constitutional duty is to decode and follow its commands, particularly
when they are clear .... [T]he U.S. Constitution explicitly disconnects
federal judges from the legislative power and, in so doing, undercuts any
judicial claim to derivative lawmaking authority." 9  Of course, this
assumption is embraced more generally, as this passage from Judge
Abner Mikva and Eric Lane suggests:
Most simply put, Congress makes laws and the courts are intended to resolve
those relatively few disputes that arise from the application of these laws. Few
would disagree (at least in theory) with Judge Posner's frequently quoted
expression of legislative supremacy: a statute is "a command issued by a
superior body (the legislature) to a subordinate body (the judiciary)."' 10
We agree that an overt effort to substitute an interpreter's sense of what
the statute ought to mean for the meaning that the legislature intended to
convey is an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, essentially
equivalent to statutory amendment or revision.
Third, we assume that statutes are a form of communication. As
Ronald Dworkin states: "[L]egislation is an act of communication to be
understood on the simple model of speaker and audience, so that the
commanding question in legislative interpretation is what a varticular
speaker or group 'meant' in some canonical act of utterance." 1 While
we regard this assumption as noncontroversial, its implications are
anything but trivial.
As a form of communication that is manufactured by, and intended
for, humans, questions of ambiguity and interpretation arise. In such
cases, the search for meaning focuses our attention on a message's
source. As J.R. Pierce, an early communication theorist, explained: "If
we regard language as an imperfect code of communication, we must
ultimately refer meaning back to the intent of the user. It is for this reason
that I ask, 'What do you mean?' even when I have heard your words."'
2
9. Manning, supra note 1, at 5, 59.
10. Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia 's Revolutionary Call
to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 124 (2000) (quoting RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265 (1990)).
11. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 348.
12. J. R. PIERCE, SYMBOLS, SIGNALS, AND NOISE: THE NATURE AND PROCESS OF
COMMUNICATION 118 (James R. Newman ed., 1961). Although less explicit than the
above statements, the assumption that statutes are communications pervades the
literature on statutory interpretation. This assumption is reflected in the discussion of
how statutes are like instruction manuals or novels, and in the standard descriptions of
nineteenth- and twentieth-century views among influential legal theorists that statutes are
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The challenge of inferring meaning from words is endemic to human
communication; a cursory inspection of any advanced dictionary will
reveal that most words have multiple meanings. 13 As a result, the
meaning of any particular word in a communicative attempt tends to
depend on the context in which it is offered. At a minimum, the meaning
that any particular word in a passage is meant to convey usually depends
on the words that follow and precede it. This is why, in many cases,
simply examining one word in isolation-for example, "duck"-is
insufficient for an accurate decoding of what meaning the sender wanted
to convey--"an animal with feathers and a bill," or "A large, heavy object
is approaching your head, bend down!"
This aspect of our language complicates interpretation. Complicating
matters further is the fact that written or spoken passages consist of
strings of words that can be ordered in an infinite number of ways.
When most of the words themselves can take on multiple meanings, the
inferential possibilities multiply. And yet, upon learning even a little
about the rules and procedures that others use when attempting to
convey ideas through words, humans gain the ability to communicate
very complicated ideas accurately in a wide range of circumstances.
Some very effective rules are grammatical, but others are not. 14 Some of
the nongrammatical rules that help us to accurately decode others'
messages come from learning more about how particular kinds of
communicative attempts are generated. For example, we learn to treat
best viewed as authoritative commands from the sovereign. See Mathew D. McCubbins
et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 432 (1989) ("[A]dministrative
procedures are one means of guiding agencies to make decisions that are consistent with
the preferences of the legislative coalition."); Mathew D. McCubbins et al.,
Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243,
244 (1987) (discussing how administrative procedures are used to limit policy actions);
Eskridge, supra note 3, at 621-22 (comparing the interpretation of statutes with the
interpretation of novels); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12
HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899) (describing statutes as commands from the sovereign);
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes
and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 189 (1986) (describing legislative
texts as orders to judges); Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV.
379, 381 (1907) ("The object of genuine interpretation is to discover the ... sense which
[the lawmaker] attached to words wherein the rule is expressed.").
13. See, e.g., GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK:
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND'S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES 92-94 (2002).
14. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 256-59 (2000).
the statement "The sky is falling" differently when it comes from a
three-year-old, a fictional chicken, or a world-renowned climatologist.
For the same reason, we may infer very different meanings of the same
words uttered by the same person depending on what we know about the
circumstances surrounding those words, such as whether or not the
person was "under oath."
Scientific attempts to understand human communication continue to
evolve. This science clarifies conditions under which the recipient of a
message can correctly discern its meaning. We contend that prominent
claims about statutory interpretation should be more informed by this
work. More to the point, a theory of interpretation should not be considered
viable unless it is based on, or at a minimum consistent with, the fact that
statutes are a form of human communication. This conclusion follows as
much from our first two assumptions as it does from our third. After all,
statutes are authoritative and binding. When an interpreter substitutes
his or her own meaning for the meaning intended by Congress, the
interpreter usurps the authority granted to the legislature by the Constitution.
Such actions illegitimately undermine democratic principles. Whether
such a substitution flows from an intentional exercise of political power
or an interpretative philosophy based on easily falsifiable claims about
human communication is irrelevant; the constitutional distribution of
authority is violated either way.
The analysis that follows is forged from these assumptions, as well as
from our belief that reconciling the practice of statutory interpretation
with the best available theory and evidence about the communicative
properties of statutes will protect and enhance modem constitutional
governance. In what follows, we describe some initial steps for
proceeding in this manner.
B. Communication, Compression, and Expansion
Whether we are communicating written words, electrical signals, spoken
language, gestures, or viruses, all communication involves the processes
of compression and expansion.15 Compression draws elements from a
large domain of information and transforms them into the form of a
signal. Humans, for example, compress ideas into language by speaking,
writing, and gesturing. The signals are then carried forward for subsequent
expansion by others.
Figure 1 depicts a very simple model of a communicative process
involving electronic data transmission to convey basic properties of
15. See C.E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS.
TECH. J. 379 (1948); PIERCE, supra note 12; FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 13.
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compression and expansion.' 6 The communicative attempt originates
with the source that intends to convey a piece of information. The
information is compressed into the form of a message whose physical
attributes allow it to be transmitted through a communicative channel,
such as a telephone line. In this example, the information compresses
into an electrical signal, which then passes through a transmitter. The
transmitter then expands the signal back into a message that it relays to
the receiver. A device at the receiver's end of the transaction uses an
algorithm to expand the transmission into data that it can use. This final
algorithm is the analogue to an interpretative procedure.
Figure 1. The Process of Communication.
Message Signal Signal Message
~Compression - Channel - Expansion -NieihReceiver
A different example now relates the same basic sequence to an
example of human communication. Figure 2 depicts a communicative
attempt between two men. George has a thought that he wishes to
communicate with Dick. Before George can communicate this thought,
however, he must compress it into a sound wave that can be transmitted
through the air to Dick. Although not reflected in the figure, the
compression of George's thought is achieved through networks of
interconnected neurons that compress his thought into motor instructions,
which then signal his vocal tract to produce sound waves.' 7 The sound
waves that George produces are then transmitted through the air to Dick,
whose ear converts the sound waves into auditory patterns, matching a
16. PIERCE, supra note 12; DAVID J.C. MACKAY, INFORMATION THEORY,
INFERENCE, AND LEARNING ALGORITHMS 3-5 (2003); Shannon, supra note 15, at 379-
423.
17. PATRICIA S. CHURCHLAND & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL
BRAIN 42-59 (1992); RAY JACKENDOFF, PATTERNS IN THE MIND: LANGUAGE AND HUMAN
NATURE 39-41 (1994).
pattern of interconnected neurons that his brain can expand back into a
thought. The compression and expansion of information allow Dick and
George to communicate with one another. 8
Figure 2. A Depiction of Human Communication.
Whether we are compressing and expanding electrical signals, human
thoughts, or some other type of information, successful communication-a
sequence where the recipient of a message decodes its meaning
accurately-requires a correspondence between the way that
information is compressed and the way that it is expanded. This
statement is true of any form of communication, be it written, spoken, or
electrical. In all cases, deriving meaning from a signal is an interpretative
act whose success depends on the correspondence between the expansion
algorithm it employs-an interpretative procedure-and the compression
algorithm that produced it. Therefore, the declaration by some textualists
that statutory interpretation frequently requires little more than reading the
words of the statute and applying them to the facts at hand is simply
18. In this process of compression, some information and detail is inevitably lost,
but such loss is not sufficient to prevent accurate decoding. For a discussion of such
"lossy" compression, see Shannon, supra note 15. See also FAUCONNIER & TURNER,
supra note 13.
George Dick
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misleading.' 9 Since the true meaning of the words is the meaning of the
statute's source, proper interpretation requires an understanding of the
constitutionally privileged compression procedure that produced it.
C. Principles of Legislative Compression
20
Statutes are compressed policy instructions or procedural guidelines.
Legislators who pass them choose their meanings, as well as the words
used to convey these meanings. Subsequent recipients of the messages
are charged with expanding meaning from these words when applying or
interpreting them. Recipients have no constitutional authority to add or
subtract their own meaning.
As a result, claims about how to interpret statutes must be based on a
viable understanding of the relevant compression dynamics. The most
relevant of these dynamics are those defined by the Constitution. The
Constitution, in turn, instructs us to begin with an examination of the
legislative process of the U.S. Congress. Indeed, if we ignore the process
by which legislators compress meaning when writing statutes, how are
we to develop an expansion scheme that accurately discerns such
meaning? For this reason, we now briefly discuss the legislative process
19. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV.
1509, 1511 (1998); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell
Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441, 441-42 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Should Reading
Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 812
(1998); Scalia, supra note 1, at 16-17, 31-32; Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 231,
231-32.
20. Note that our analysis applies to "framework legislation" as well. As Elizabeth
Garrett notes, framework legislation creates guidelines that structure congressional
lawmaking, and it also establishes internal procedures that structure legislative voting
and deliberation. Far from being mere frameworks, however, such legislation is
frequently part of more comprehensive laws that include delegations of authority to the
Executive or that have legal effects beyond merely influencing congressional procedure.
See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 717 (2005); Elizabeth Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Elizabeth Garrett, The Impact of Bush
v. Gore on Future Democratic Politics, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
POLITICS 141, 156-60 (Gerald M. Pomper & Marc D. Weiner eds., 2003); see also
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369 (1989). Although Congress may provide such procedural guidelines, these statutes
remain communications even if the policies are developed later and through
implementation instruments such as agencies.
with an eye toward developing a corresponding expansion scheme
that jurists can use when interpreting statutes.
As shown in Figure 3, federal legislators in the United States-in this
case members of the House of Representatives-develop procedures that
any successful statute must survive. These procedures are approved by
the legislature and, therefore, have constitutional legitimacy. All legislators
consent to the procedures that produce the statutes.2 1 Therefore, if we
can use knowledge of how legislative procedure affects statutory
compression to clarify statutory meaning, our inferences will not be
poisoned by the fact legislators may have different feelings about the
procedure.
This point is particularly relevant because both houses of Congress
have chosen procedures that give particular actors substantial control over
the process by which statutes pass. This unequal distribution of power
means that the statements of some actors in some situations can provide
reliable information about what a procedurally, and hence constitutionally,
empowered subset of legislators meant when they constructed a statute's
meaning. As we suggest below, this implies that communications
among members of the majority party who supported a statute at key
moments in the drafting and internal evaluation processes are, all else
constant, a better place to find such information.
For the purpose of deriving a statute's meaning, it is important to
understand when legislators (particularly those in the majority party) can
discuss, revise, or amend a statute, for this set of circumstances provides
the general pool from which constitutionally validated records of
legislative reasoning can be drawn. In the initial stages of the congressional
lawmaking process, members of substantive committees in each chamber
possess significant agenda control within their jurisdiction. It is at this
stage where the drafting of statutes begins, where the writing of committee
reports takes place, and where conversations between committee chairs
21. Note that this consent extends all the way to what it means for a statute to pass.
It is common to presume that, with the exception of a few explicitly mentioned cases, a
majority is sufficient to pass a bill in each legislative chamber. However, nowhere in the
Constitution is a legislative majority directly empowered to pass a law. A majority is
required for a quorum. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 5. Majority requirements are also explicitly
mentioned in descriptions of Congress's role in executive branch selection and
succession procedures. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; U.S. CONST.
amend. XXV. However, the power of a legislative majority comes from Article I,
Section 5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings .... "). In the House, majority rule is used to the chamber's rules-though
the Constitution does not prevent it from switching to other rules, such as 55% approval
by the Committee of the Whole as a necessary condition for passage.
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and majority party committee members are held. These committees are
almost always controlled by the majority party.22
Figure 3. How a Proposal Becomes a Policy in the U.S. House of
Representatives, Highlighting Aspects of Party Control.
Speaker & Speae&
given e7 p r h atkfo he r's Committee Committee
P .t een J a a r teRferralRule iewof e Floor
Other Conferencel Presden Bueoeta Appropet- Flol
Indeed, since the late nineteenth century, legislative procedures have
given extraordinary powers to a chamber's majority party.2 This is
22. Steven J. Balla, Legislative Organization and Congressional Review ofAgency
Regulations, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 424, 442 (2000) ("[C]ongressional review provides
minority party members with an opportunity to oppose regulations whose development
has been overseen by committees controlled by the majority party.").
23. JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA 4 (1995); GARY W. COX & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN: PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE HOUSE 233 (1993) [hereinafter
COX & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN]; GARY W. Cox & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS,
SETTING THE AGENDA: RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 19 (2005) [hereinafter Cox & MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA]; D.
RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1 (1991); DAVID W.
ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE, at ix (1991); John H. Aldrich
& David W. Rohde, The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for
Theories of Congressional Politics, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 541, 541-42 (1998); John H.
particularly true in the U.S. House of Representatives. The first act of
every legislative session typically entails legislators delegating the
legislature's agenda-setting authority and the task of allocating the
legislature's scarce resources to the majority party leadership. At the
same time, however, legislators do not give away all authority, nor do
they grant authority unconditionally. The distribution of power is
regulated by an internal system of checks and balances. Legislative
procedures provide some actors with a veto over the actions of agenda
setters and give others an opportunity and incentive to act as checks.
These procedures may be very subtle. In the House, backbenchers may
check the actions of their leaders through the committee process and
must give their consent and approval to their leaders' actions in plenary
meetings.24
As a given proposal approaches the floor, the Rules Committee and the
Speaker-as well as the Appropriations Committee if any funding is
required to implement the proposal-check committee members' ability to
propose legislation, for these two central coordinating bodies control access
to plenary time.25  All of these entities are strongly controlled by the
majority party. Therefore, during floor debates, the bill manager for the
majority party controls the time devoted to debate and to particular
amendments, determining which members speak and for how long.26 It is
not unusual for a number of amendments to be added to a proposal during
this stage, unless, of course, the majority party-controlled Rules Committee
grants a special rule that limits the number and nature of amendments.
27
As this discussion makes clear, the congressional process reflects a
conversation among members of the majority party. Indeed, in passing
legislation, legislators in the majority party communicate with each other
and with other members about the meaning of statutes. They also present
evidence and arguments about proposed laws, trying to secure support or
build opposition.
Aldrich & David W. Rohde, The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the
Electoral Connection, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 269, 269 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., Cong. Q. Press 7th ed. 2001); Gerald Gamin & Steven S.
Smith, Policy Leadership and the Development of the Modern Senate, in PARTY,
PROCESS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HISTORY OF
CONGRESS 287, 289 (David W. Brady & Mathew D. McCubbins eds., 2002); Charles 0.
Jones, Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership
in the House of Representatives, 30 J. POL. 617, 617-18 (1968).
24. ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. McCuBB1NS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 212-14 (1998).
25. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical Construction and
Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 669, 692 (2005).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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To be sure, legislators communicate with nonlegislators, and for
purposes other than the facilitation or defeat of legislative proposals.
Sometimes, legislators grandstand for the media or their constituents;
sometimes, they issue warnings or plant hints for executive agencies or
even courts; and sometimes, they complain about being shut out of the
legislative process altogether (this is particularly true for members of the
minority party). Some of this communication is of dubious interpretive
value, as we may question its sincerity or veracity, and some of it is
valuable.28
However, there are circumstances where some members, specifically
those in the majority party, use tools-such as committee reports,
statements by the bill manager, communications by the party whips, and
so on-to signal the meaning of the statutes they have written to the
remaining members of the chamber. Do all of these circumstances
produce equally valuable information about a statute's meaning? No.
The checks and balances that legislators agree to impose on one another
affect the extent to which particular pieces of legislative history constitute
credible statements of the meaning to which constitutionally empowered
actors understand themselves to be agreeing. Next, we provide a template
for developing an interpretative expansion scheme that is consistent with
such compression dynamics.
IlI. EXPANSION OF LEGISLATIVE MEANING
A. Constitutionally Privileged Commands and Judges
as Flies on the Wall
The legislative process is a conversation among legislators. At each
stage of the legislative process, legislators communicate with one other.
In the process, they compress meaning by drafting statutes, writing
committee reports, participating in floor debates, offering amendments,
and engaging in various other legislative tasks. Key to our approach is
the notion that these statutes are constitutionally privileged commands.
They are directed toward everyone who is charged with interpreting,
implementing, or following the law. As a result, judges must listen
28. McNollgast, supra note 6; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 57 LAW. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 3 (1994) [hereinafter
McNoligast, Legislative Intent]; Rodriguez & Weingast, Positive Political Theory, supra
note 6.
passively to legislators' conversations so that their expansions
correspond to the way that statutory meaning was compressed into
words. They must not assume that legislators were speaking only to
them in their conversations. Rather, judges must listen to and interpret
these conversations from the vantage point of a fly on the wall.
Moreover, our initial examination of legislative compression suggests
that judges should not treat legislators' conversations as though
legislators were listening naively to everything or being lied to about
everything.
Given this perspective, what tools enable judges to decode statutory
meaning accurately? We advocate two: the intentional stance and portions
of legislative history. These tools reflect how legislators compress
statutory meaning and, thus, enable judges to expand such meaning
accurately.
Cheryl Boudreau, Mathew McCubbins, and Daniel Rodriguez describe
intentionalist theories of interpretation as an approach to discerning
statutory meaning.2 9 Judges should take, to use Daniel Dennett's
terminology, an "intentional stance., 30 That is, judges should not suppose
that legislators necessarily have an intent in the ordinary sense in which
we view individuals as having intentions; rather, they should treat them
as rational agents with beliefs, desires, and intentions for the purposes of
discerning meaning. Indeed, the intentional stance is a tool used by all
humans (be they judges, legislators, or ordinary citizens) on a constant
basis to figure out what the actions and statements of others (be they
individuals or groups) mean. 31
This process of imputing intentions to those we seek to understand is a
fundamental characteristic of human cognition.32 To make an inference
about what someone means requires a theory of how they think. For
example, it is possible for a random word generator to produce the
sentence, "Don't step on my hand." In such a case, the meaning that the
statement's source meant to convey is quite different than the meaning
that we would infer if the source was a human whose hand was being
quickly eclipsed by the shadow of another's shoe. The intentional stance
is a theory of what humans mean when they speak.
In the context of statutes, the intentional stance requires that judges
treat legislators as rational actors with beliefs, desires, and intentions and
then interpret their statements in this light. 33  In our reading, the
29. Boudreau, McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 6.
30. DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE 17 (1987).
31. Id. at 15.
32. DENNET-, supra note 30; Boudreau, McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 6.
33. See Boudreau, McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 6.
[VOL. 44: 957, 2007] What Statutes Mean
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
intentional stance recognizes that legislators have the ability to delegate
to select colleagues, as well as the ability to communicate a statute's
meaning on behalf of the group with constitutionally validated authority.
So, for example, if I give you the explicit authority to speak on my
behalf, and if I do not exercise a subsequent option to say that you are
not speaking on my behalf, then it is reasonable for other people to infer
that your words reflect my thoughts.
Legislative histor is a second tool that enables judges to decode
statutes accurately. In contrast to canons of construction, legislative
history is created by legislators as they pass specific statutes, and therefore,
it can allow judges to be privy to legislators' conversations about particular
statutes. Indeed, because the legislative process generates committee
reports, legislators' speeches, amendment votes, and other pieces of
legislative history, judges may be able to use them to understand better
the way that legislators compress statutory meaning and the way that
they should expand it.
B. Not all Legislative History is Created Equal
Having advocated legislative history as an interpretative tool, we in no
way suggest that judges ought to use legislative history indiscriminately.
Indeed, not all legislative history is created equal, for some aspects of
legislative history are trustworthy indicia of legislative meaning and
others are not. Thus, the task for judges is to determine which aspects of
legislative history are trustworthy and to rely only upon those sources
when decoding statutory meaning.
How are judges to sort through the many sources of legislative
history? At first blush, the proper use of legislative history seems to be
an onerous task-one to which scholars often refer when they discuss
the intractability of legislative history and the need for other, simpler
methods of interpretation.35 Rather than summarily dismissing the use
34. Legislative history is widely, though often clumsily, used. For a discussion of
such clumsy uses, see McNollgast's analysis of Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253 (D.C. Cir. 1972). McNollgast, supra note 6, at 705, 733-34, 740-41; McNollgast,
Legislative Intent, supra note 28, at 29-31.
35. Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1461-62 (2007)
(discussing the textualist attack on the use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (declaring that "the quest for the 'genuine' legislative
intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway"); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a
of legislative history as an impossible endeavor, judges should trust only
those sources that were trustworthy for the constitutionally empowered
set of legislators who passed the bill at the time of the communication.
Stated differently, if legislators in their conversations ignore certain
sources of information because those sources are not trustworthy, then so
should judges. We offer an approach that helps to identify trustworthy
sources of legislative history by clarifying the sources on which legislators
have incentives to rely and by providing judges with new guidelines for
using legislative history more effectively.
To this end, we begin by drawing upon strategic communication
theories from economics and political science to identify conditions for
trustworthy communication. We then apply these conditions for trust to
the legislative process and analyze sources of information that legislators
can and cannot trust. We conclude this section by claiming that judges
can use legislative history to better interpret statutes if they restrict
themselves to relying only on sources that constitutionally empowered
legislators themselves would trust.
C. The Conditions for Sincerity
Sincerity is a familiar concept to people who study communication,
and it is a particularly relevant concept in debates about the proper
method of interpreting statutes. As we noted above, in contexts such as
the legislative process, incentives to be insincere-that is, to grandstand,
exaggerate, or misrepresent the truth-may be great. Thus, the challenge
for judges using legislative history to interpret statutes is to distinguish
sincere statements of legislative meaning from insincere ones. At first
blush, this seems to be a quite difficult task; however, strategic
communication models developed in political science and economics
shed much light on the conditions under which legislators have incentives to
speak sincerely. 36 These conditions, in turn, suggest guidelines for how
judges should use legislative history to decode a statute's meaning.
Although sincerity is often invoked as an assumption rather than
treated as a communicative choice, several strategic communication
models derive sincerity as an emergent property of a communicative
equilibrium. Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins developed one such
model.3 7 It clarifies conditions under which one strategic actor can learn
"They, " Not An "It": Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 239,
254 (1992) (describing the concept of legislative intent as "meaningless").
36. See, e.g., LUPIA & MCCUBBINS,supra note 24.
37. Id. at 45-51. Their model builds on the model of Vincent P. Crawford and Joel
Sobel, as well as David Austen-Smith. See Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic
Information Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA: J. ECONOMETRIC SOC'Y 1431 (1982); D.
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from the statements of another, conditions under which cognitively
limited actors can use the advice of others to adapt to their own limited
information, and the conditions under which the design of institutions
affects communicative incentives. We use their work to identify necessary
and sufficient conditions for sincerity in the legislative context.
38
A direct implication of these conditions, which were proven using
formal logic, is that sincerity requires neither reputation, nor repeated
play, nor any speaker attribute such as common interests, partisanships,
ideologies, or backgrounds. A person's attributes-past history, ideology,
partisanship, reputation, actual level of knowledge, or affective relationship
to the listener-may in fact have no bearing whatsoever on whether or
not he is sincere. Instead, external forces, such as the institutional
context within which the actor makes a statement, can substitute for
personal attributes as determinants of sincerity. To see how, consider
that institutions affect incentives in ways that make it clear to all
observers that false statements are more costly than others. For
example, in a court of law where there exist penalties for perjury, these
institutions supply witnesses with a rationale for telling the truth, and
consequently provide jurors with a rationale for believing what they
hear. That institutional factors can substitute for personal attributes as a
cause of sincerity is helpful to questions of statutory meaning because of
the former's observability. In cases where a person's attributes provide
limited information about their incentives to communicate sincerely, this
substitutability gives an analyst an opportunity to derive this information
from other sources-such as well-documented legislative procedures.
Austen-Smith, Credible Debate Equilibria, 7 SOC. CHOICE AND WELFARE 75, 77-79
(1990); David Austen-Smith, Information Transmission in Debate, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI.
124, 126-30 (1990); David Austen-Smith, Information and Influence: Lobbying for
Agendas and Votes, 37 AM. J. POL. Sci. 799, 801-06 (1993).
38. Readers interested in the formal derivation of these conditions should consult
LUPIA & McCUBBINS, supra note 24, at 69-74. Our interest here is in whether or not a
speaker will reveal what he knows. Note that understanding this dynamic is but one part
of answering questions about when a strategic listener should believe a strategic speaker.
Therefore, only an element of our previous work is relevant here. It should be noted that
this particular element-in which the attributes and knowledge of the listener are
ignored-is more similar to the extant literature on signaling games than is the whole of
our model. Note also that Lupia and McCubbins did not use the term sincerity in THE
DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 24. Instead, they derived
conditions under which persuasion and enlightenment-for example, gaining knowledge-
would emerge from strategic communication. The term sincerity as we use it here
applies only to the element of that research directly relevant to whether or not the
speaker reveals what he knows.
Lupia and McCubbins's model yields four conditions for sincerity.
The first three are listed and discussed below.39 If any of these conditions
are met, then the speaker should be regarded as sincerely expressing his
meaning.4°
1. The listener and speaker share common interests.
41
2. The listener correctly infers that the speaker faces a sufficiently
high statement-specific cost, such as a penalty for lying.
3. The listener and speaker believe that the truthfulness of the
speaker's statement will be verified with a sufficiently high
probability.
42
As these conditions were derived from a formal model of legislative
communication, it is reasonable to ask whether they are viable empirically.
Since it is difficult to vary the attributes of actual legislative contexts,
this question cannot be answered directly. Lupia and McCubbins, however,
conducted a wide range of empirical evaluations of the logic of their
model, including a rigorous set of laboratory experiments. This range of
activities provides strong support for the model.
We now discuss examples of how the kinds of institutional variables
mentioned above allow legislators to learn from and trust each other in
39. The fourth condition for sincerity requires a speaker to undertake observable,
costly effort. As Lupia and McCubbins emphasize, when a speaker takes a costly
action--exerts effort-this reveals something to the listener about how much a particular
outcome is worth to the speaker:
For example, if a knowledgeable speaker pays $100 for the opportunity to
persuade us, then we can infer that the difference in expected value to the
speaker between what the speaker expects us to do after hearing his statement
and what the speaker expects us to do if we do not hear the statement is at least
$100. Therefore, even if the speaker ultimately delivers his statement in a
language that we do not understand, the speaker's payment informs us that our
choice is important to him .... Specifically, the [listener] can infer how much
the speaker's preferred alternative differs from the one that she would have
chosen otherwise.
Id. at 58-59.
40. This definition implies nothing about the speaker's actual knowledge. So a
speaker can be sincere, but can be offering false information. Note that the possibility of
a sincere, but uninformed, speaker makes capability and sustainability necessary for
credibility in the context of economic reform. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins,
Political Credibility and Economic Reform: A Report for the World Bank, July 4, 1998,
at 6-7, http://mccubbins.ucsd.edu/ARTFl.pdf.
41. The listener and the speaker have common interests when outcomes that are
good for one are good for the other, and outcomes that are bad for one are bad for the
other. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 24, at 77-78.
42. A speaker's statement is verified when a third party authenticates it. If the
speaker's statement may be verified, then it is less likely that he will benefit from
making a false statement. Indeed, "as the probability of verification increases, the
probability that the speaker can benefit from sending a false signal decreases." Id at 56
(footnote omitted).
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the U.S. Congress and enable judges, as flies on the wall, to identify
those sources of legislative history that are trustworthy indicia of
legislative meaning.
1. Common Interests
Throughout the legislative process, legislators spend a substantial
amount of time and energy identifying the people and groups they can
trust.43 For example, at the beginning of each Congress, two of the most
important business items are the election of leaders and the appointment
of members to committees. Members of Congress place great importance
on screening those who control the House's agenda.4 Further, on many
issues for which they lack expertise, legislators turn to like-minded
colleagues or their party whips for advice.45
Of course, in some instances the interests of the membership of a
committee are sufficiently different from the interests of other legislators.
For example, the members of the U.S. House Agriculture Committee are
often seen to be more sympathetic to farm and rural interests than are
other members.46 Absent external forces, we would not expect endorsements
47from these committees to be persuasive. In cases where common
43. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES 25 (1973) [hereinafter
FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES]; RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE
MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 27 (1978) [hereinafter FENNO, HOME STYLE]; see also
John W. Kingdon, Models of Legislative Voting, 39 J. POL. 563, 572 (1977) (discussing a
cue-taking model of legislative voting, which involves, for example, legislators
following the guidance of their colleagues whom they "consider[] to have 'good political
judgment'... in order to vote in a way most likely to satisfy constituents").
44. See NELSON W. POLSBY, THE CITIZEN'S CHOICE: HUMPHREY OR NIXON? (1968); see
also FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES, supra note 43; KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE
GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE
(1978); STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS (2d ed.
1990); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION (1991); Nelson
W. Polsby, Miriam Gallaher & Barry Spencer Rundquist, The Growth of the Seniority
System in the U.S. House of Representatives, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 787, 788-89 (1969).
45. See JOHN W. KINGDON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (3d ed. 1989); see
also JOHN E. JACKSON, CONSTITUENCIES AND LEADERS IN CONGRESS: THEIR EFFECTS ON
SENATE VOTING BEHAVIOR (1974); Donald R. Matthews & James A. Stimson, Decision-
Making by U.S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model, in POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
14, 29-32 (S. Sidney Ulmer ed., 1970); DONALD R. MATTHEWS & JAMES A. STIMSON,
YEAS AND NAYS: NORMAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(1975); LAUROS G. MCCONACHIE, CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES (Burt Franklin Reprints
1973) (1898).
46. See Cox & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 23.
47. See KREHBIEL, supra note 44, at 105-50.
interests are absent, persuasion and trust require external forces. The
following describes examples of such forces.
2. Penalties for Lying
Legislators use penalties for lying to create a basis for trust in contexts
where trust would otherwise be absent. Penalties for breaking a trust are
the basis of many behavioral norms in the U.S. Congress. 48  These
penalties can be quite large, including loss of leadership positions. The
penalties must be sufficient in scope and reliability to generate truth
telling. Of course, if a penalty for lying or the likelihood of its enforcement
is small, then the penalty will dissuade few lies. As a consequence, the
penalty may be insufficient to generate trust. For example, remarks made
during open floor time by representatives while the House is in recess
are not greatly affected by penalties for lying. This is one reason why
legislators frequently ignore this type of testimony, and judges should
follow suit.
3. Verification
Legislators also use the threat of verification as a way to elicit sincere
statements from their colleagues. One way that verification can be
established in the legislative process is through competition. As
philosophers and institutional designers have long recognized, competition
can induce trustworthy communications. 49 The constitutional structure
of government and subsequent decisions about legislative procedure
determine the number and quality of competing information sources
available to legislators. In legislatures that are open to the opposition, to
the media, and to interest groups, for example, verification becomes
much more likely than when it is closed.
Take, for example, the legislative process in the U.S. House of
Representatives depicted in Figure 3, where a bill must pass through
many steps before it can be sent to the Senate and the President and be
48. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES, supra note 43.
49. See, e.g., NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (Harvey C. Mansfield trans.,
Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (1513); CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans., 1989); THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Relying on the Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J.
ECON. 18 (1986); Charles M. Cameron & Joon Pyo Jung, Strategic Endorsements (Mar.
14, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Department of Political Science,
Columbia University).
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implemented as a new policy.50 Throughout this process, the ambitions
of the majority party leadership are pitted against the ambitions of the
party's backbenchers, and this inherent competition between party
leaders and backbenchers increases the likelihood that statements made
by some legislators will be verified by others.
As Figure 3 shows, a bill must be introduced, referred to a committee,
and then to a subcommittee. From there, important measures also go
through the Rules Committee before being debated and voted on on the
House floor. Once enacted, new legislation is then subject to the budget
and reconciliation process and the appropriations process, each of which
has its own sets of committees and its own rules and procedures.51
Proposals must run this gauntlet before the policy enacted by the legislation
can be implemented. Through this process, policymaking substantive
committees (such as the aforementioned Agriculture Committee) are
checked by the Appropriations Committee, the Rules Committee, and
the Budget Committee, which are "control" committees designed and
appointed for this purpose.52 In this way, members of various committees,
each with expertise on the legislation before the House, can verify the
statements and claims made by others in the legislative process. To the
extent that the ambitions of these various actors are adversarial, or to the
extent that other institutional features induce these actors to speak
sincerely, the system of checks and balances described in Figure 3 will
generate conditions for judges to learn what constitutionally empowered
actors meant in their construction of a particular statute.
D. Judges as Flies on the Wall
Throughout the legislative process, legislators rely principally upon
those sources of information that emerge within a constitutionally privileged
set of procedures and that occur in contexts where the conditions for
sincerity are satisfied. Judges should also rely solely upon these trustworthy
sources when using legislative histories to interpret statutes. 53 Equally
50. George Tsebelis describes a similar procedure for parliamentary systems.
George Tsebelis, Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies, in
PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 83 (Herbert Doring ed., 1995).
51. See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, HOW OUR LAWS ARE MADE, H.R. Doc. No. 108-93,
at 36-37 (2003).
52. See Cox & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 23, at 20.
53. See FREDERICK JOSEPH DE SLOOVERE, CASES ON INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
(1931); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW &
important for our analysis is understanding how to assess which sources
of legislative history are particularly unreliable. The above discussion
suggested that statements offered during the legislative process by members
of the minority party ought to be heavily discounted. This discounting is
appropriate because such statements do not meet any of the conditions
for sincerity. In particular, since majority party leaders never ceded control
of powerful committees to the minority party, the threat of removal from
leadership positions is unavailable as a penalty for lying. To the extent
that minority party members cannot suffer from majority party
retribution-and given that the minority is likely to lose all legislative
battles anyway, this is not a difficult criterion to satisfy-minority party
members have little to lose from spinning legislative proposals in the
hopes of sealing the proposal's doom. And if the proposals pass despite
their opposition, they have everything to gain from spinning the
legislation in a way that furthers their aims once the statute comes before
a court for interpretation.
In their study of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its interpretation by
the federal courts in the 1970s and 1980s, Daniel Rodriguez and Barry
Weingast describe how the courts relied upon self-interested statements
of "untrustworthy" legislators in order to interpret statutes in expansive
and fundamentally inaccurate ways. 54 Building upon McNollgast's
55
analysis of strategic legislative rhetoric, Rodriguez and Weingast's
assessment of strategic legislative behavior and the courts' selective use
of legislative history illustrates the perils of relying on untrustworthy
legislative history. Further, it helps frame the distinction between correct
and incorrect expansion of statutory communications.56
One conclusion drawn by Rodriguez and Weingast is particularly
relevant. At the time, pivotal legislators from both parties were willing
to support a moderate version of civil rights legislation. Although they
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994); Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference
to Agency Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REv.
431 (1996); Matthew L. Spitzer, Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of
Administrative Agency Behavior, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 29 (1990). Notice this argument
implies the need for a greater reliance on administrative agencies as key statutory
interpreters, which will be the topic of a later paper.
54. Rodriguez & Weingast, Positive Political Theory, supra note 6.
55. McNollgast, supra note 6; McNollgast, Legislative Intent, supra note 28; see
also John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 12
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice
Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the Grove City and
State Farm Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The
Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's
Court-Packing Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992).
56. See also Rodriguez & Weingast, Paradox, supra note 6, for a more general
discussion of the political consequences of these expansionist interpretations.
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were content to permit President Johnson, Senator Humphrey, and others
to insist that the final version of the Civil Rights Act was broad and
expansive, these legislators believed the ultimate bill reflected carefully
constructed compromises between ardent supporters and themselves. To
their subsequent chagrin, federal courts in the 1970s and 1980s drew
upon statements in the legislative history made by ardent supporters and
thereby expanded the civil rights legislation beyond the acceptable range
of agreement among this pivotal coalition. Had moderate legislators
understood that such interpretations were likely, there is serious doubt
that they would have been as willing to compromise and thereby to
enable the civil rights bill to become law. As Rodriguez and Weingast
posit, the misuse of legislative history by eager liberal courts made it
considerably more difficult to secure legislative assent for analogous
measures during the 1970s to early 1980s, an era in which the majority
Democratic Party and its allies undertook major efforts to enact
watershed national legislation.
IV. ON THE VIABILITY OF EXISTING CLAIMS
Having advocated an approach to statutory interpretation that
emphasizes its communicative and constitutionally privileged command
attributes, we now consider the viability of other schools of statutory
interpretation. We contend that three of the main schools of statutory
interpretation-textualism, purposivism, and other approaches that substitute
legal or social values for legislative intent-advocate improper
expansion schemes because they ignore or misunderstand important
aspects of the process by which statutory commands are compressed.
A. Textualism
It is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to
evidence in order to raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a
rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it
exists. If Congress has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more
limited meaning than might be attributed to it by common practice, it would be
arbitrary to refuse to consider that fact when we come to interpret a statute. 57
In the past twenty years, an updated version of Justice Holmes's "plain
meaning" approach to statutory interpretation has gained an influential
57. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928).
following. Prominent advocates such as Justices Scalia and Thomas
advocate a robust form of textualism in which courts may not consult
external indicia of statutory meaning but, instead, should simply apply
the plain meaning of the statute's text to the case at hand. This plain
meaning "must be the alpha and the omega in a judge's interpretation of
the statute. 58
How is the court or interpreter to discern plain meaning? Says
William Eskridge, summarizing the new textualist view: "The apparent
plain meaning is that which an ordinary speaker of the English language-
twin sibling to the common law's reasonable person-would draw from
the statutory text. '59
The key consequence of this textualist approach is the rejection of the
use of legislative history when discerning statutory meaning. As Judge
Alex Kozinski, a leading proponent of textualism, forcefully argues:
[R]eliance on legislative history actually makes statutes more difficult to
interpret by casting doubt on otherwise clear language....
.. Legislative history is often contradictory, giving courts a chance to pick
and choose those bits which support the result the judges want to reach ...
This shifts power from the Congress and the President-who, after all, are
charged with writing the laws-to unelected judges. The more sources a court
can consult in deciding how to interpret a statute, the more likely the
interpretation will reflect the policy judgments of the judges and not that of the
political branches.60
While we do not disagree with the facts laid out in this quote, we note
a logical leap required to get from these facts to bold textualist
pronouncements. The leap is one from difficult to impossible. Facts
such as those stated complicate interpretative attempts and allow for
legislation from the bench. These facts, however, are far from sufficient
to establish the conclusion that the practice of referring to select
components of legislative history can never help a judge decode a statute's
meaning with greater accuracy. Claims to the contrary are sheer folly.
To be fair, many textualists would not draw such a severe conclusion.
Whether and to what extent other extrinsic aids ought to be consulted in
interpreting statutory language that is not plain is a source of disagreement
among self-styled textualists. 6' For some, the principal extrinsic aid is
a dictionary; 62 for others, courts may rely on canons of construction, at
58. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1511; see also Easterbrook, supra note 19, at 441-
42; Kozinski, supra note 19, at 812; Scalia, supra note 1, at 16-17, 31-32; Schauer,
supra note 19, at 231-32.
59. Eskridge, supra note 19, at 1511.
60. Kozinski, supra note 19, at 813.
61. See, e.g., John Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 70, 75 (2006).
62. Id. at 88 & n.64.
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least those canons that purport to guide courts in construing ambiguous
language-what is called "a default set of assumptions about how the
legislature uses language, grammar, punctuation, and structure.,
63
Nevertheless, we contend that the interpretative advice offered by the
new textualism is suspect, and likely improper, because it entails a
method of expansion that is inconsistent with the legislative compression
processes described above. So while we concur with the textualists'
suspicion that legislative histories can be manipulated by activist
interpreters, the wholesale rejection of legislative history is inconsistent
with the goal of basing interpretation on the best available theory and
information. By rejecting the use of legislative history and by failing to
consider the statements of bill managers, committees and their chairs,
and other members of the majority party, the textualists ignore important
aspects of how legislators compress and thereby share information about
the meaning of statutes during the legislative process.
A further implication of the textualists' hesitance to link their preferred
expansion procedures to the compression procedures that produce statutes
can be seen in how they use "canons of construction." 64 These so-called
grammatical canons entail a series of assumptions about how legislators
use language-assumptions that, to the best of our knowledge, were
created by judges and developed in case law. 65 Such canons do not reflect
the ways that legislators compress meaning when writing statutes and,
therefore, do not permit accurate decoding of statutory meaning.
To take a concrete example, consider the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
the "Whole Act rule"-a canon that assumes that every word legislators
write imparts new meaning-when interpreting the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.66 CERCLA grants the
federal government broad authority to respond directly to releases or
threatened releases of substances that might endanger public health or
the environment, and legislators use series of similar words throughout
63. Paul Michell, Book Note, Just Do It! Eskridge 's Critical Pragmatic Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 41 McGILL L.J. 713, 724 (1996).
64. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 14, at 389-97 (listing and
discussing canons of construction); see also McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at
708-14 (surveying and debating canons of construction).
65. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 14, at 261-67.
66. 270 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001).
the statute to convey their meaning. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3)
defines "disposal" as follows:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling,
leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or
water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters. 67
Similarly, § 962 l(e)(2) states:
A State may enforce any Federal or State standard, requirement, criteria, or
limitation to which the remedial action is required to conform under this chapter
in the United States district court for the district in which the facility is
located. 68
According to the Whole Act rule, judges interpreting these subsections
of CERCLA must discern the meaning of each italicized word in the
series of words that the legislators wrote. That is, judges must analyze
the meaning of "standard," "requirement," "criteria," and "limitation," and
they should assume that legislators intended to convey a different meaning
for each word.
This is very much the approach the Ninth Circuit took in Carson
Harbor.69 When interpreting "disposal," the court considered each of
the slightly different meanings of the words "discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing," and held that the passive migration
of contaminants through soil did not constitute a "disposal" under the
definition in the statute.7 ° Writing for the majority, Judge Margaret
McKeown emphasized that despite the logical difficulties associated
with considering each word in the definition of "disposal," legal canons
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000) (emphasis added). The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, defines "disposal"
for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) with reference to the definition of "disposal" in the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(29) (2000). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act defines "disposal" at
42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 962 1(e)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
69. This is similar to the approach Justice Scalia took in West Virginia University
Hospitals v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
interpreted the words "attorney's fee" in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and he concluded that these
words do not include expert fees because "the record of statutory usage demonstrates
convincingly that attorney's fees and expert fees are regarded as separate elements of
litigation cost. While some fee-shifting provisions, like § 1988, refer only to 'attorney's
fees,' . . . many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as well as attorney's fees." Id.
at 88. Justice Scalia then explained that, if attorney's fees include expert fees, "dozens of
statutes referring to the two separately become an inexplicable exercise in redundancy."
Id. at 92 (emphasis added).
70. Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 887.
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of construction require such an analysis. In analyzing the phrase "disposal
or placement of the hazardous substance" in § 9601(35)(a), she stated:
We are bound.., to give meaning to every word of a statute. Frustratingly, this
canon of construction leads to the shortest of logical cul-de-sacs in this case. If
we give meaning to both "disposal" and "placement," how are the words different,
particularly if we consider that "placement" is included in the statutory definition of
"disposal"? And if the defense is available to anyone who purchases after
"disposal," why repeat "placement"-a mere subcategory of "disposal"?
7 1
Judge McKeown raises an important question: Why did Congress
repeat the word "placement," given that it is merely a subcategory of
"disposal"? The Whole Act rule and other canons of construction give
us virtually no purchase on this question because they require judges to
interpret statutes based upon abstract assumptions about how legislators
use language. Indeed, in this example, the Whole Act rule forced Judge
McKeown into "the shortest of logical cul-de-sacs" because it required
her to interpret the words of the statute as though legislators meant
something different by each word that they wrote.
72
However, redundancy (that is, writing or saying things multiple times in
slightly different ways-such as we are doing within these parentheses) is a
key part of human communication. It enables humans to convey more
effectively what they mean. Legislators, too, write and speak similar
statements in slightly different ways in order to compress meaning during
the legislative process and to ensure successful communication with each
other, with agencies, with courts, and with society. For this reason, judges
interpreting statutes, if they are to expand statutes in a way that corresponds
to how they were compressed, must abandon canons of construction like
71. Id. at 883. Judge McKeown went on to state:
Clearly, neither a logician nor a grammarian will find comfort in the world of
CERCLA. It is not our task, however, to clean up the baffling language
Congress gave us by deleting the words "or placement" or the word "disposal"
from the innocent landowner defense. Transported to Washington D.C. in
1980 or 1986, armed with a red pen and a copy of Strunk & White's Elements
of Style, we might offer a few clarifying suggestions. But in this time and
place, we can only conclude that Congress meant what it said, and offered the
innocent landowner defense to both those who purchased land after "disposal"
or after "placement," thereby giving "disposal" its statutory meaning and
"placement" its ordinary one, despite their overlap.
Id. at 883-84.
72. Id. at 883.
the Whole Act rule and instead examine critically the often redundant
communication process among legislators.73
B. Purposivism
Another method of statutory interpretation is purposivism. In contrast
to textualism, purposivists interpret statutes based upon their underlying
purpose and use the text of statutes only as a vehicle for, or a check on,
the fulfillment of that purpose. This approach has been advanced most
prominently by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks,74 who set forth the following
guidelines for proper purposivist interpretation:
In interpreting a statute a court should: 1. Decide what purpose ought to be
attributed to the statute and to any subordinate provision of it which may be
involved; and then 2. Interpret the words of the statute immediately in question
so as to carry out the purpose as best it can, making sure, however, that it does
not give the words either-(a) a meaning they will not bear, or (b) a meaning
which would violate any established policy of clear statement. 75
It is clear from these guidelines that, for purposivists, the determination of
statutory purpose is of paramount importance, while the actual words that
legislators wrote are secondary. What is not clear from these guidelines,
however, is how exactly judges are to determine the purpose of statutes
absent an examination of statutory language. For example, Hart and Sacks
explicitly state that judges should first decide the purpose of a given statute
and then interpret the words of that statute. But if this is how judges are to
interpret statutes, then how should they determine statutory purpose? The
answer, according to purposivists, is that judges are free to determine the
purpose based upon their own views of what is reasonable. Indeed, Peter
Schanck summarizes this aspect of purposivism when he states:
[In the] purposive legal process approach . . . courts determine which
interpretation best fulfills the purpose of the statute. The judge would assume
that legislators were reasonable people intending reasonable results who would
have wanted the judge to identify a reasonable public purpose and decide cases
in light of recent experience. This approach ... decides cases according to the
judge's views of the best result.76
73. Substantive canons are yet another matter that we address in McCubbins &
Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 708-14.
74. HART & SACKS, supra note 2; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423
(1988); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
75. HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1169.
76. Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for
Statutory Interpretation, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2592 (1992) (citation omitted).
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In this way, purposivism encourages judges to interpret statutes based
upon the assumption that legislators are "reasonable" and upon their own
views of what constitutes a "reasonable public purpose." However, in
advancing their approach to statutory interpretation, purposivists
misunderstand and then completely ignore the legislative process.
Purposivists clearly misunderstand the legislative process when they
assume that legislators are "reasonable people intending reasonable results.
This attribution of benign intentionality has been roundly criticized
already,78 and as our previous discussion of the legislative process suggests,
this assumption is based upon naive notions of how legislatures actually
work. Indeed, a large body of research within political science has
demonstrated that the legislative process is characterized not by
"reasonable" legislators intending "reasonable results," but rather by
a majority party that seizes agenda control79 and by legislators who care
first and foremost about reelection.8" Purposive interpretation, therefore,
misfires as a method of discerning statutory meaning. It can be defended, if
at all, on grounds extrinsic to the objective of implementing the will of
the legislature through an understanding of statutory communication.
It is worth noting, moreover, that some scholars consider textualism to
be a weak form of purposivism. For example, Manning states:
[I]t is worth suggesting why textualism, properly understood, does not permit
interpreters to ignore context, purpose, rationality, or established notions of
justice in the application of a statutory text. Four considerations support this
conclusion. First, textualists do not forswear purposive interpretation of
statutes. Rather, they are weak purposivists, willing to consider purpose when
the text of a statute is ambiguous as applied.
8 1
77. Id.
78. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 334 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 398 (1990); Farber & Frickey,
supra note 74.
79. COX & MCCUBBINS, LEGISLATIVE LEVIATHAN, supra note 23; Cox &
MCCUBBINS, SETTING THE AGENDA, supra note 23; John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde,
The Republican Revolution and the House Appropriations Committee, 62 J. POL. 1
(2000).
80. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); FENNO,
HOME STYLE, supra note 43; MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE
WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); BRUCE CAIN, JOHN FEREJOHN & MORRIS P.
FIORINA, THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE
(1987).
81. Manning, supra note 1, at 106.
If textualism is in fact a weak form of purposivism, however, then it
also falls prey to the criticisms we have just described.
C. Noninterpretivism
Several approaches to statutory interpretation suggest that some
meaning other than the meaning expressed in the statute and intended by
the legislature be substituted for the statute's meaning. 82  This may
involve interpreting statutes to enhance the "integrity of law"83 or to reflect
"current social values., 84 It may involve an effort to interpret legislation
"dynamically,'" 8 5 in order to update the statute to meet modem purposes
and needs.86 Whatever the case for these theories, we join with others in
describing these approaches as clearly noninterpretivist.
82. These noninterpretative approaches build on the realist perspective. BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE
COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 508-10 (1931); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY,
THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 198 (1964); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 262 (1990); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983);
Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957); William A. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975);
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431
(1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). They also have a palpable skepticism of the legislature,
which dates to Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930), and
more modem critiques of the legislative process and its product. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY
& GARRETT, supra note 14, at 121-227 (discussing various deficiencies in the legislative
process); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE
INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004); S.M. Amadae & Bruce
Bueno de Mesquita, The Rochester School: The Origins of Positive Political Theory, 2
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 269 (1999); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party
Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567
(1988); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L.
REV. 373 (1988).
83. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 225-28, 255-56.
84. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 633; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION].
85. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 84, at 9-11, 48-
49.
86. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 32 (1982);
Aleinikoff, supra note 3; Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2074 (2002); Macey, supra note 74; Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45
VAND. L. REV. 647 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law,
38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 434 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes].
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Among the more influential noninterpretivist theories is Ronald Dworkin's.
In Law's Empire, Dworkin describes the relative role of the legislature
and courts as follows:
[A judge interpreting a statute] will treat Congress as an author earlier than
himself in the chain of law, though an author with special powers and
responsibilities different from his own [as a judge], and he will see his own role
as fundamentally the creative one of a partner continuing to develop, in what he
believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Congress began.
8 7
Dworkin views his theory as a guide to legal interpretation; statutory
interpretation is one element of a more general template. Yet he offers
precious little to suggest that courts ought to pay any special fidelity to
the will of the legislature. His theory, while elegant and plausible, is not
properly viewed as a theory of statutory interpretation, where interpretation
concerns the discerning of statutory meaning in order to implement the
policy objectives of the elected legislature. Rather, it is a noninterpretivist
theory that propounds a distinct normative view of the role of law in
implementing substantive justice.
A different agenda for statutory interpretation is offered with considerable
skill by a diverse group of scholars including Cass Sunstein s8 and
Jonathan Macey.8 9 These scholars view the role of courts aspirationally,
suggesting courts ought to interpret statutes to improve the legislative
process in discernable ways. For Macey, courts ought to increase the
costs to pressure groups by insisting that throwaway public-regarding
language in statutes, particularly in the statute's preamble, be interpreted
strictly, therefore reducing the private-regarding benefits to interest
groups who have demanded this policy.9 ° Sunstein believes courts should
rely on various substantive canons in order to improve public lawmaking
in the modem administrative state.91 While some of these canons implement
key values, the principal advantage to such strategically configured
canonical construction is that it helps "perfect" the legislative process.
92
Whatever the strengths of these eloquently defended approaches, they
are avowedly noninterpretivist; they do not purport to match the
87. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 313.
88. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 86.
89. Macey, supra note 74.
90. Id. at 226, 240-50.
91. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 86, at 464, 468.
92. Cf JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (describing process-perfecting
theory of constitutional interpretation).
expansion of the legislature's communications with the lawmakers'
efforts to compress this communication in the legislative process. In
other words, there is a deep compression-expansion mismatch. As a result,
these approaches in no way assist courts in properly interpreting the
communication.
In a very different vein, Judge Frank Easterbrook has argued for an
approach to statutory interpretation that eschews reliance on legislative
history and concentrates on either the plain text of the statute when the
text is clear (and, therefore, the interpretive issue is resolved within the
"statute's domain") or on the evolving common law of the subject at
issue. 93 In the latter circumstance, the court's task is not to interpret the
statute at all; interpretation in such situations is beside the point. Rather,
the court ought to be guided by the common law, by judge-made law.
Certainly this practice in such circumstances is noninterpretive;
Easterbrook's theory supposes as much. Yet, we would claim that so-
called interpretation in the first circumstance is similarly noninterpretivist.
After all, the construction of the statute's domain is a creative act in
that it is an act dislodged from the legislative compression-expansion
process; it does not recognize the statute as a communication from an
authoritative lawmaker. As such, the process of resolving the dispute is
not in any way an act of discerning the statute's meaning. Indeed,
Easterbrook's view could credibly be viewed as one in which the judge
infuses the statute with his or her own preferences for policy outcomes.
94
Whatever the case for this heroic conception of judicial imagination, it is
decidedly noninterpretivist in the sense we have described.
A more recent noninterpretivist theory is William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn's approach to interpreting "super-statutes., 95 According to Eskridge
and Ferejohn, super-statutes are those laws that penetrate society's
culture and norms to such an extent that they deserve quasi-constitutional
status and require a distinct method of interpretation. These scholars
consider the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to be quintessential examples of such statutes, and after describing
why statutes such as these should be considered "super,, 96 Eskridge and
Ferejohn instruct judges in how to interpret them:
93. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983).
94. Id. at 535.
95. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215
(2001).
96. Specifically, Eskridge and Ferejohn set forth the following definition of a
super-statute:
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does
"stick" in the public culture such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional
or normative principles have a broad effect on the law-including an effect
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Ordinary rules of construction are often suspended or modified when such
statutes are interpreted. Super-statutes tend to trump ordinary legislation when
there are clashes or inconsistencies, even when principles of construction would
suggest the opposite....
... For super-statutes, which are to be construed liberally and purposively,
interpreters should apply words broadly and evolutively, the way the courts
have applied terms like "restraint of trade" (Sherman Act), "discriminate" (Civil
Rights Act), and "take" (ESA). 97
Given Eskridge and Ferejohn's emphasis on interpreting super-statutes'
language "broadly and evolutively" and on allowing super-statutes to "trump"
other pieces of legislation, it is clear that their approach to interpretation
is a variant of the noninterpretivist approach that Dworkin, Eskridge, and
others advocate.
The above descriptions make clear that these legally or socially valued
approaches are not focused on the ways that legislators compress statutory
meaning via the legislative process. Indeed, these approaches explicitly
encourage judges to disregard legislative signals about the meaning of a
statute and to substitute current norms and values for the meaning that the
legislature intended to convey. 98 "As conditions and attitudes change," says
one reviewer of Eskridge, "a statute's meaning evolves." 99 Judges and law
scholars may or may not have good reasons for advocating methods of
interpretation that eschew interpretation. But, these methods should be
recognized for what they are: an abandonment of interpretation, in favor of
other forms of judicial decisionmaking; and, albeit more controversially,
they represent a rejection of the principle of legislative supremacy embodied
in Article I of the U.S. Constitution. These approaches may be appropriate,
yet they entail a trade-off between legislative supremacy and some other
end. Whatever that end is, it does not seem to be based on constitutional
principles.
beyond the four comers of the statute. Super-statutes are typically enacted
only after lengthy normative debate about a vexing social or economic
problem, but a lengthy struggle does not assure a law super-statute status. The
law must also prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time, such
that its earlier critics are discredited and its policy and principles become
axiomatic for the public culture. Sometimes, a law just gets lucky, catching a
wave that makes it a super-statute. Other times, a thoughtful law is unlucky,
appearing at the time to be a bright solution but losing its luster due to
circumstances beyond the foresight of its drafters.
Id. at 1216.
97. Id. at 1216, 1249.
98. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 14, at 339-47.
99. Michell, supra note 63, at 728.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article revisited the debate over statutory interpretation-a debate
that has occupied more than its share of scholarly energy-and examined
the interpretative project through a lens that regards statutes as
communications of constitutionally privileged commands. With logically
coherent theories of communication and lawmaking, we offered a template
for improving how judges decode statutes. Our analysis highlighted the
importance of considering the mechanics of legislative compression when
advocating, as an interpretative method, a particular expansion algorithm.
Building on the earlier work of Lupia and McCubbins, we then discussed
how the interpreter ought to sort reliable from unreliable sources of legislative
history. Lastly, we contrasted these lessons with key themes in the modem
literature on statutory interpretation. When stacked against contemporary
theories, including textualism, purposivism, and noninterpretivism, we
contend that our approach sheds useful light on how to decode statutory
meaning. 00
We do not endeavor here to provide a comprehensive theory of statutory
interpretation; nor do we address systematically the various issues concerning
the use and misuse of legislative history and interpretative canons. Rather,
our general framework, building deliberately on communication theory and
on the emerging positive political theory of legislative lawmaking, merely
opens up a new vein in the enduring conversation over statutes and their
proper interpretation.
100. Although beyond the scope of this Article, we note that these interpretive
lessons also apply to the interpretation of judicial opinions. As Adrian Vermeule
astutely notes, scholars often overlook the similarities between the legislature and the
judiciary, and they fail to pay sufficient attention to the fact that the judiciary, like the
legislature, is a collectivity. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive
Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). In a
similar manner, we emphasize that scholars ought to pay more attention to the fact that
judges, like legislators, communicate with each other and with other political institutions
(namely, lower courts) in ways that the Constitution sanctions directly. Given that their
opinions are proffered using the same language from which statutes are drawn, commensurate
problems of interpretation follow. Because of this similarity, the interpretive lessons that
we have described throughout this Article may also apply to the "conversations" between
appellate and lower courts. Accurate decoding of such communications is, therefore,
more likely if informed by the mechanics of judicial compression.
